GWOT III - Homeland Safety Report
Sep. 14th, 2021 01:42 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
drewkittyGWOT III - Homeland Safety Report
To: San Jose Regional Operations, California Regional Operations, Western Region Operations
CC: Safety Controller, Critical Incident Notice Group, Human Resources, Fatality Group
RE: onsite homicide of Homeland Officer [name redacted to notify next of kin]
Summary:
At about 1109 hours on [DATE], Homeland Officer [NameRedacted] was fatally injured on premises at the San Jose Office. He was performing his duties conducting routine interrogation of a treason suspect when he was struck repeatedly with a blunt object. Despite all efforts on his behalf, he was pronounced dead on arrival at Valley Medical Center San Jose.
Narrative:
At 0630 hours [SUSPECT] was removed from his cell in a 'routine' cell extraction and placed in Interrogation Room #6-14. Per doctrine he was handcuffed with his hands in front of him and these handcuffs were secured to a bolt in the table with a doubled belly chain. In violation of doctrine leg shackles were not applied, and therefore a second belly chain was not secured between the non-applied leg shackles and the handcuffs. Two essential elements of the restraint system were therefore omitted.
On interview and through observation of operations management and the safety controller, it was determined that multiple cell extraction teams were no longer consistently following full restraint practice with 'high risk' prisoners. One process fault was that for operational security reasons, cell extraction teams were not always aware of the high risk status of a prisoner. Over the past several months, there had been many occasions where a prisoner was 'high risk' labeled but was not actually high risk. (Note: this included a thirteen year old male with a broken arm.) Cell extraction teams complained about the rating system and in response the prisoner classification team removed their access to the ratings. This resulted in a lax, ad-hoc approach to whether a particular prisoner, in some cases _on a particular day_ (emphasis added), required full cell extraction procedures followed by full restraints, or would be handled less rigorously for the convenience of the staff and the prisoner.
Cell extraction teams, when interviewed about [SUSPECT], noted that in fact he had been unusually cooperative with their efforts to restrain and move him, even when taken to rigorous interrogation cells such as Room 6-19. Any resistance was involuntary and cursory. One extraction team leader observed that [SUSPECT] had clearly been a security specialist familiar with prisoner handling, as he had conveniently turned his wrists and ankles to make the application of restraints more convenient, did not complain about mild inconveniences, and only made mild verbal protest on the rare occasions that he tripped and fell into hallway walls and cell fixtures.
In retrospect this should have been viewed as a severe RED FLAG. Selected quotes from the Homeland Detainee Manual: "Any prisoner familiar with prisoner handling techniques should be handled at a higher, if not the highest, security level." "Persons who are consistently cooperative with prisoner handling may be trying to lull captors into a false sense of safety." "A prisoner's first violent noncompliance may be their most dangerous."
Minute post-event examination of Cell #6-14 found the following contraband item on the floor:
-- a office supply paper clip, bent into a pin shape
When suspect was taken into custody by the cell extraction team, he was wearing one handcuff on his right wrist. The handcuff that should have been on his left wrist was dangling free. The belly chain was on the floor nearby.
The implication is that [SUSPECT] used the paper clip as an ersatz handcuff key to open the lock and shackle on the left cuff. This allowed him to free himself from the bolt in the interrogation table and attack the Homeland officer, resulting in the latter's fatal injuries.
Proximal Cause:
-- repeated strikes with a blunt object to the skull, including the left temple, the right temple, the eyes and the face
Contributory Causes:
-- failure to adequately restrain a treason suspect whose file was noted as 'dangerous, trained in close combat', in particular failure to secure his leg restraints per doctrine
-- the presence of a blunt object on the custody side of the interrogation facility
-- lack of situational awareness on the part of the deceased officer
-- failure of the deceased officer to carry his assigned wireless Officer Attack Alarm
-- lack of combative skills on the part of the deceased officer, in permitting an unarmed suspect weak from confinement and interrogation to attack and ultimately murder him.
This is a preliminary report. Further details will follow.
To: San Jose Regional Operations, California Regional Operations, Western Region Operations
CC: Safety Controller, Critical Incident Notice Group, Human Resources, Fatality Group
RE: onsite homicide of Homeland Officer [name redacted to notify next of kin]
Summary:
At about 1109 hours on [DATE], Homeland Officer [NameRedacted] was fatally injured on premises at the San Jose Office. He was performing his duties conducting routine interrogation of a treason suspect when he was struck repeatedly with a blunt object. Despite all efforts on his behalf, he was pronounced dead on arrival at Valley Medical Center San Jose.
Narrative:
At 0630 hours [SUSPECT] was removed from his cell in a 'routine' cell extraction and placed in Interrogation Room #6-14. Per doctrine he was handcuffed with his hands in front of him and these handcuffs were secured to a bolt in the table with a doubled belly chain. In violation of doctrine leg shackles were not applied, and therefore a second belly chain was not secured between the non-applied leg shackles and the handcuffs. Two essential elements of the restraint system were therefore omitted.
On interview and through observation of operations management and the safety controller, it was determined that multiple cell extraction teams were no longer consistently following full restraint practice with 'high risk' prisoners. One process fault was that for operational security reasons, cell extraction teams were not always aware of the high risk status of a prisoner. Over the past several months, there had been many occasions where a prisoner was 'high risk' labeled but was not actually high risk. (Note: this included a thirteen year old male with a broken arm.) Cell extraction teams complained about the rating system and in response the prisoner classification team removed their access to the ratings. This resulted in a lax, ad-hoc approach to whether a particular prisoner, in some cases _on a particular day_ (emphasis added), required full cell extraction procedures followed by full restraints, or would be handled less rigorously for the convenience of the staff and the prisoner.
Cell extraction teams, when interviewed about [SUSPECT], noted that in fact he had been unusually cooperative with their efforts to restrain and move him, even when taken to rigorous interrogation cells such as Room 6-19. Any resistance was involuntary and cursory. One extraction team leader observed that [SUSPECT] had clearly been a security specialist familiar with prisoner handling, as he had conveniently turned his wrists and ankles to make the application of restraints more convenient, did not complain about mild inconveniences, and only made mild verbal protest on the rare occasions that he tripped and fell into hallway walls and cell fixtures.
In retrospect this should have been viewed as a severe RED FLAG. Selected quotes from the Homeland Detainee Manual: "Any prisoner familiar with prisoner handling techniques should be handled at a higher, if not the highest, security level." "Persons who are consistently cooperative with prisoner handling may be trying to lull captors into a false sense of safety." "A prisoner's first violent noncompliance may be their most dangerous."
Minute post-event examination of Cell #6-14 found the following contraband item on the floor:
-- a office supply paper clip, bent into a pin shape
When suspect was taken into custody by the cell extraction team, he was wearing one handcuff on his right wrist. The handcuff that should have been on his left wrist was dangling free. The belly chain was on the floor nearby.
The implication is that [SUSPECT] used the paper clip as an ersatz handcuff key to open the lock and shackle on the left cuff. This allowed him to free himself from the bolt in the interrogation table and attack the Homeland officer, resulting in the latter's fatal injuries.
Proximal Cause:
-- repeated strikes with a blunt object to the skull, including the left temple, the right temple, the eyes and the face
Contributory Causes:
-- failure to adequately restrain a treason suspect whose file was noted as 'dangerous, trained in close combat', in particular failure to secure his leg restraints per doctrine
-- the presence of a blunt object on the custody side of the interrogation facility
-- lack of situational awareness on the part of the deceased officer
-- failure of the deceased officer to carry his assigned wireless Officer Attack Alarm
-- lack of combative skills on the part of the deceased officer, in permitting an unarmed suspect weak from confinement and interrogation to attack and ultimately murder him.
This is a preliminary report. Further details will follow.
