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TOP SECRET
SECURE COMPARTMENTALIZED INTELLIGENCE
PROJECT COLORED GARMENT
KEYWORDS PURPLE SWEATER, RED JACKET, BLACK BOW, BLUE SHIRT, GREEN PANTS

Unauthorized access to this document is a felony under the law. Report security violations _immediately_ to your Facility Security Officer.

STATUS UPDATE - SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA INTERCEPT CAPABILITY

Security Notice: only analysts cleared for COLORED GARMENT should be able to access STATUS UPDATE(s). Analysts cleared at lower levels will be provided _verbal_ repeat _verbal_ summaries of the elements relevant to their project.

The nuclear detonations in San Francisco and at San Francisco International Airport severely damaged the communications infrastructure of the San Francisco Bay Area. Numerous data centers were destroyed outright. Many fiber optic lines were severed. Repair capacity was diverted to national defense infrastructure. Satellite bandwidth was retasked to supporting the China invasion.

Unreliable power and water (for industrial cooling) as well as continuing stability challenges (which also inhibit fuel deliveries) continue to impact data centers on the periphery of the affected area. Each major company successfully shifted the bulk of its live capability to facilities outside the SF Bay area within minutes of the attack. (Exception: Red Jacket, see below.) So the primary impacts have been on stored data rather than functionality.

Caveat: post-Firecracker emergency compartmentalization of US Internet data traffic from the global Internet was accomplished hastily and focused primarily on protection from cyberwar. This concern continues due to the vast array of connections between the US and other countries. High bandwidth connections are largely monitored but monitoring resources also have been diverted. It remains possible to send E-mail, etc. to and from Internet addresses outside the USA.

PURPLE SWEATER: several thousand employees were killed immediately or within 24 hours of the attack. An immediate decision was made to evacuate survivors to facilities in northern Nevada and some from there to Utah. Executive protection teams requested and received helicopter evacuation of key executives. No attempt has been made to restore any PURPLE SWEATER functionality locally. Physical contents of buildings have been centralized to a single campus location and are presently guarded by a single Oregon National Guard transport company with a skeleton crew of caretaker PURPLE SWEATER staff.

Given the conditions no effort has been made to restore PURPLE SWEATER monitoring capabilities in the Bay Area.

RED JACKET: pre-Firecracker estimates of platform redundancy were overgenerous. Not only did RED JACKET data centers not "fail over" to other sites nationwide, but data corruption from timing errors compromised TS/SCI data on the compartmentalized RED JACKET Federal network. Some of this data was still live as much as a week after the Firecracker and is known to have been compromised to foreign sources. Two RED JACKET facilities remain nominally operational in the San Francisco Bay Area; one operated by US Army Corps of Engineers and one by the City of Santa Clara. Limited network (including 3G, 4G, GSM, etc) and audio monitoring remains available in these facilities only. Video of key points is being stored locally; video analytics are possible but limited by bandwidth concerns. All other Bay Area RED JACKET facilities have been confirmed destroyed or properly sanitized - obviously no monitoring remains in sanitized locations.

BLACK BOW: although employee casualties were very light (would have been <10 if a sales conference had not been taking place in San Francisco), an executive decision was made within hours to evacuate all personnel to the Los Angeles area. As with PURPLE SWEATER, remaining contents of buildings were centralized to a single site. This material has been sanitized and no material of TS/SCI concern remains. Note that large numbers of BLACK BOW personnel were either returned to military service or drafted into cyberwar defense efforts. The BLACK BOW singular product remains out of service and is not expected to be restored to service for the duration of the War. (No one has time.)

Unfortunately requests for pre-Firecracker BLACK BOW analytics cannot be honored. If an investigative file contained such analytics, they have been preserved.

BLUE SHIRT: the primary BLUE SHIRT campus in the Bay Area is up and running with a combination of mains and generator power. However, the onsite data center is very limited in its ability to service customer needs and has _not_been backed up since the Firecracker. (Primary customer: DOD.) Physical security has been evaluated by Homeland as "adequate."

Investigation has determined that the primary Blue Shirt monitoring node for this facility was destroyed in a terrorist attack approximately two weeks after the nuclear strike. Agents infiltrated on site have determined that neither Blue Shirt nor the attackers know of this, and the damaged equipment has been sanitized. Unfortunately, no excuse has been found for the reinstallation of this equipment, but efforts will continue.

Blue Shirt monitoring is therefore limited to software rather than hardware devices. [TS/SCI REDACTED - XREF COLORED GARMENT TECHNICAL OVERVIEW.] Further, due to the cell phone network being down in Blue Shirt's campus area, a modified VPN/WiFi phone service has been established which is not yet properly compromised.

GREEN PANTS: the company has reduced its footprint from over 100 physical buildings to less than ten, and terminated large numbers of H1B visa holders who represented a substantial security risk. Approximately 40% of same have been interned and the remainder to be repatriated to their countries of origin. [TS/SCI REDACTED - XREF HOMEWARD BOUND]

All Green Pants monitoring capabilities including hardware and software remain fully operational within the reduced footprint. This includes 3G, 4G, etc. Note: due to the extraordinary importance of Green Pants functionality to numerous US agencies including DHS and DOD, some access to satellite links has been provided. Take great care to avoid use of satellite links which could compromise Colored Garment through network traffic analysis.

END END END

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