gaming the Strait
Jul. 21st, 2008 09:52 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
drewkittyThe most important sea waterway in the world is the Strait of Hormuz, through which large amounts of oil tanker traffic pass. This is an essay about how hard it would be for Iran to close it, and some related outcomes.
Located in the Persian Gulf, the Strait is bordered by Iran on the north and the Gulf oil states on the south. The navigable passage is six miles wide within an area only thirty-five miles wide. The tightly congested waters of the San Pedro / Long Beach harbors look positively roomy by comparison. 75% of Japan's oil passes through this choked and shallow waterway, full of nautical traffic and oil platforms and buoys and other obstacles.
If the Iranians are unsuccessful in closing the Strait, or only do so for a short time, the effects on the world economy are minimal. There is also no guarantee that if Iran closed the Strait, that Iranian oil tankers would ever be permitted to use it again. If nothing else, air dropped mines from B-52 bombers generating sorties from the United States could guarantee that. Since much of the Iranian economy depends on this oil, Iran should not kick off this move unless they believe they are under grave threat anyway -- such as an unprovoked US or Israeli air attack, the possibility of which has been widely discussed.
If the Iranians were to close the Strait for more than two weeks, however, they could do grave damage to the world economy, with increasingly dire effects on the US economy. Think prices of $200 or more per bbl translating to $6 per gallon gasoline prices, especially on the West Coast.
The United States and particularly the Navy has committed to its allies that Iran will not be permitted to close the Strait. Barring the use of weapons of mass destruction (discussed as a sidebar below), the results of a concerted effort to close the Straits in opposition to a determined US attempt to keep them open are by no means certain.
Iranian weapons and assets include a very large number of gunboats, enormous numbers of mines (mostly local and pressure manufacture, but with access to advanced types provided by China), a handful of modern aircraft, a dubious small surface navy and three marginal capability Kilo diesel-electric submarines, and an array of short and medium range anti-shipping and cruise missiles. Some of the latter are truck mounted.
In opposition the United States has a number of surface warships, advanced aircraft including carrier strike aircraft and helicopters, special operations and amphibious forces, and a number of nearby land bases of mixed value. Strategic assets include cruise missiles and submarines.
American forces can fairly easily protect themselves from direct attack, except by mines and anti-shipping missiles. Naval mines function as an area denial weapon, requiring combatants to plan carefully and/or bring mine sweeping assets if they intend to operate in potentially mined areas. Anti-shipping missiles are a major threat, if in limited numbers, and launched en masse could sink warships. Damaging a well protected carrier is unlikely.
Merchant vessels, especially oil tankers, are very vulnerable to direct attack. So running convoy operations through the Gulf is like protecting eggshells with a bodyguard of sledgehammers, against a flock of slingshots ("boghammer" speedboats) and caltrops (mines) as well as the occasional single-shot rifle (cruise missile).
The Iranians will run out of cruise missiles quickly, whether in attacks on American warships (sure to generate casualties and political effects for the home audience) or on merchant shipping. They would be wise to conserve for the latter, but in a war interfering with American free use of the Gulf would be a major strategic goal to protect their remaining assets. These truck-mounted missiles will move from hardened bunker to hardened bunker on a road net, much like the Iraqi SCUDs with more sophistication and determination. Much American airpower will need to be tied up to destroy this missile network; opening such airpower to surface-to-air missile attacks and keeping it from being used on the gunboats.
The United States can be expected to launch an all-out effort to destroy Iranian power projection capacity in the Gulf. This would include physically destroying support bases on Iranian islands and the mainland; taking and probably destroying Iranian oil platforms used as support bases; and raid operations against major Iranian harbors (occupation is out of the question with the relatively small Marine forces available). This would eliminate the Iranian navy, start a short clock (60 days or less) on continued submarine operations, reduce the effectiveness of speedboats, and much as in the "Scud Hunt" in Iraq, reduce the ability of Iranian anti-shipping missiles to launch coherently. The destruction of much of the Iranian oil infrastructure in the Gulf is also likely.
It would not affect the ability of the Iranian government to continue its nuclear programs, to control its population, or to support terrorism across the Iraq border -- nor would it effectively deter Iranian terrorist attacks on US interests in the Gulf, Europe or even the United States. Any attacks on the Iranian nuclear program (largely hardened) would distract American airpower from forcing back open the Gulf.
It is likely that the Iranians will retain some capacity even under such comprehensive attacks. For one factor, the Iranian Navy and Revolutionary Guard are independent armed services, and the latter will keep fighting even after the former is destroyed.
One possibility is that the Iranians will continue running their mine strategy using one or more submarines as mine command vessels and microsubs to lay replacement mines. Another possibility is that (with Chinese help) the Iranians have already laid enough bottom mines, rocket mines, and other exotic types under fiber optic control that sweeping would be very difficult.
This will be the high tech battle: whether the decades-long planning of Iranian and Chinese planners defeats the ingenuity of the United States Navy, its two dedicated mine countermeasures ships in the region, and various anti-mine methods ranging from sacrificial tankers with holds full of Styrofoam through sweeps towed by helicopter up to and including underwater drones and (insanely brave) Navy divers.
US Navy victory is certain in the mine war, the only question is the timing. Even mining experts don't know if it would take weeks or months to sweep the Straits sufficiently. If the latter, the Iranians will have won at least a Pyrrhic victory.
Once the anti-shipping missiles have all been fired or destroyed and all the mines have been disarmed or detonated, the remaining light gunboats will still be a major threat to merchant shipping. Armed with heavy machine guns, light hand-held missiles (RPG-7 and sometimes various shoulder-launched SAM) and often with the ability to drop one or two World War II era mines, these are not a credible threat to warships.
If the same gunboats are packed with high explosive, however, they could readily destroy tankers and threaten warships. The latter have significant countermeasures; the former do not.
Anyone who claims that the gunboat threat can be lightly dismissed is a fool. The question is whether Iran runs out of gunboats before civilian shippers, merchant vessel captains and their insurance carriers decide to drop out of the game. If nothing else, requiring tankers to run in convoy instead of singly would itself reduce the carrying capacity of the Gulf lanes.
The larger strategic question is not whether or not it would be an unholy mess. The question is how long it would take America, probably by ourselves, to clean up the mess before the international shipping community throws up its collective hands and polishes brasswork instead of risking tanker hulls.
As for weapons of mass destruction, the Iranians have some limited chemical weapons capability. The temptation to use it would be great, especially against US and allied land bases and oil facilities. (The latter are most annoying to decontaminate quickly.) Merchant shipping would be totally unprotected, yet warships completely immune. This could be resolved to some extent by putting naval prize crews in chemical warfare gear on merchant ships, but the shortage of trained sailors and deck officers would be quickly acute.
However, the US doctrine of nuclear use in retaliation for chemical use should give the Iranians at least some pause. Tactical employment of nuclear weapons would maximize the effectiveness of air power in destroying Iranian naval infrastructure, at the price of much world outcry and an increase in global political instability for many years to come. (The use of nuclear weapons for underwater mine clearing is a subject I have been able to find surprisingly little information about, other than the multi-layered half-joking statement that "Nukes only blow holes in the water, and fish don't vote.") Biologicals are ineffective against military forces. Nuclear weapons, if any, would best be used strategically by Iran on medium-range missiles as a final deterrent to forced regime change. Nuking Israel would release that nation's stockpile of over 200 weapons, and Iran has a plethora of such targets reachable by Israeli arms. Persia would glow for far longer than Tel Aviv. Smuggling such a nuke or nukes to America is the makings of cheap techno-thrillers; many means to prevent this are in effect.
[Note: this essay was written while clicking through a mandatory online training program I have heard three times but in which my progress was not saved. "Just an hour to complete" my achy huevos!]
Located in the Persian Gulf, the Strait is bordered by Iran on the north and the Gulf oil states on the south. The navigable passage is six miles wide within an area only thirty-five miles wide. The tightly congested waters of the San Pedro / Long Beach harbors look positively roomy by comparison. 75% of Japan's oil passes through this choked and shallow waterway, full of nautical traffic and oil platforms and buoys and other obstacles.
If the Iranians are unsuccessful in closing the Strait, or only do so for a short time, the effects on the world economy are minimal. There is also no guarantee that if Iran closed the Strait, that Iranian oil tankers would ever be permitted to use it again. If nothing else, air dropped mines from B-52 bombers generating sorties from the United States could guarantee that. Since much of the Iranian economy depends on this oil, Iran should not kick off this move unless they believe they are under grave threat anyway -- such as an unprovoked US or Israeli air attack, the possibility of which has been widely discussed.
If the Iranians were to close the Strait for more than two weeks, however, they could do grave damage to the world economy, with increasingly dire effects on the US economy. Think prices of $200 or more per bbl translating to $6 per gallon gasoline prices, especially on the West Coast.
The United States and particularly the Navy has committed to its allies that Iran will not be permitted to close the Strait. Barring the use of weapons of mass destruction (discussed as a sidebar below), the results of a concerted effort to close the Straits in opposition to a determined US attempt to keep them open are by no means certain.
Iranian weapons and assets include a very large number of gunboats, enormous numbers of mines (mostly local and pressure manufacture, but with access to advanced types provided by China), a handful of modern aircraft, a dubious small surface navy and three marginal capability Kilo diesel-electric submarines, and an array of short and medium range anti-shipping and cruise missiles. Some of the latter are truck mounted.
In opposition the United States has a number of surface warships, advanced aircraft including carrier strike aircraft and helicopters, special operations and amphibious forces, and a number of nearby land bases of mixed value. Strategic assets include cruise missiles and submarines.
American forces can fairly easily protect themselves from direct attack, except by mines and anti-shipping missiles. Naval mines function as an area denial weapon, requiring combatants to plan carefully and/or bring mine sweeping assets if they intend to operate in potentially mined areas. Anti-shipping missiles are a major threat, if in limited numbers, and launched en masse could sink warships. Damaging a well protected carrier is unlikely.
Merchant vessels, especially oil tankers, are very vulnerable to direct attack. So running convoy operations through the Gulf is like protecting eggshells with a bodyguard of sledgehammers, against a flock of slingshots ("boghammer" speedboats) and caltrops (mines) as well as the occasional single-shot rifle (cruise missile).
The Iranians will run out of cruise missiles quickly, whether in attacks on American warships (sure to generate casualties and political effects for the home audience) or on merchant shipping. They would be wise to conserve for the latter, but in a war interfering with American free use of the Gulf would be a major strategic goal to protect their remaining assets. These truck-mounted missiles will move from hardened bunker to hardened bunker on a road net, much like the Iraqi SCUDs with more sophistication and determination. Much American airpower will need to be tied up to destroy this missile network; opening such airpower to surface-to-air missile attacks and keeping it from being used on the gunboats.
The United States can be expected to launch an all-out effort to destroy Iranian power projection capacity in the Gulf. This would include physically destroying support bases on Iranian islands and the mainland; taking and probably destroying Iranian oil platforms used as support bases; and raid operations against major Iranian harbors (occupation is out of the question with the relatively small Marine forces available). This would eliminate the Iranian navy, start a short clock (60 days or less) on continued submarine operations, reduce the effectiveness of speedboats, and much as in the "Scud Hunt" in Iraq, reduce the ability of Iranian anti-shipping missiles to launch coherently. The destruction of much of the Iranian oil infrastructure in the Gulf is also likely.
It would not affect the ability of the Iranian government to continue its nuclear programs, to control its population, or to support terrorism across the Iraq border -- nor would it effectively deter Iranian terrorist attacks on US interests in the Gulf, Europe or even the United States. Any attacks on the Iranian nuclear program (largely hardened) would distract American airpower from forcing back open the Gulf.
It is likely that the Iranians will retain some capacity even under such comprehensive attacks. For one factor, the Iranian Navy and Revolutionary Guard are independent armed services, and the latter will keep fighting even after the former is destroyed.
One possibility is that the Iranians will continue running their mine strategy using one or more submarines as mine command vessels and microsubs to lay replacement mines. Another possibility is that (with Chinese help) the Iranians have already laid enough bottom mines, rocket mines, and other exotic types under fiber optic control that sweeping would be very difficult.
This will be the high tech battle: whether the decades-long planning of Iranian and Chinese planners defeats the ingenuity of the United States Navy, its two dedicated mine countermeasures ships in the region, and various anti-mine methods ranging from sacrificial tankers with holds full of Styrofoam through sweeps towed by helicopter up to and including underwater drones and (insanely brave) Navy divers.
US Navy victory is certain in the mine war, the only question is the timing. Even mining experts don't know if it would take weeks or months to sweep the Straits sufficiently. If the latter, the Iranians will have won at least a Pyrrhic victory.
Once the anti-shipping missiles have all been fired or destroyed and all the mines have been disarmed or detonated, the remaining light gunboats will still be a major threat to merchant shipping. Armed with heavy machine guns, light hand-held missiles (RPG-7 and sometimes various shoulder-launched SAM) and often with the ability to drop one or two World War II era mines, these are not a credible threat to warships.
If the same gunboats are packed with high explosive, however, they could readily destroy tankers and threaten warships. The latter have significant countermeasures; the former do not.
Anyone who claims that the gunboat threat can be lightly dismissed is a fool. The question is whether Iran runs out of gunboats before civilian shippers, merchant vessel captains and their insurance carriers decide to drop out of the game. If nothing else, requiring tankers to run in convoy instead of singly would itself reduce the carrying capacity of the Gulf lanes.
The larger strategic question is not whether or not it would be an unholy mess. The question is how long it would take America, probably by ourselves, to clean up the mess before the international shipping community throws up its collective hands and polishes brasswork instead of risking tanker hulls.
As for weapons of mass destruction, the Iranians have some limited chemical weapons capability. The temptation to use it would be great, especially against US and allied land bases and oil facilities. (The latter are most annoying to decontaminate quickly.) Merchant shipping would be totally unprotected, yet warships completely immune. This could be resolved to some extent by putting naval prize crews in chemical warfare gear on merchant ships, but the shortage of trained sailors and deck officers would be quickly acute.
However, the US doctrine of nuclear use in retaliation for chemical use should give the Iranians at least some pause. Tactical employment of nuclear weapons would maximize the effectiveness of air power in destroying Iranian naval infrastructure, at the price of much world outcry and an increase in global political instability for many years to come. (The use of nuclear weapons for underwater mine clearing is a subject I have been able to find surprisingly little information about, other than the multi-layered half-joking statement that "Nukes only blow holes in the water, and fish don't vote.") Biologicals are ineffective against military forces. Nuclear weapons, if any, would best be used strategically by Iran on medium-range missiles as a final deterrent to forced regime change. Nuking Israel would release that nation's stockpile of over 200 weapons, and Iran has a plethora of such targets reachable by Israeli arms. Persia would glow for far longer than Tel Aviv. Smuggling such a nuke or nukes to America is the makings of cheap techno-thrillers; many means to prevent this are in effect.
[Note: this essay was written while clicking through a mandatory online training program I have heard three times but in which my progress was not saved. "Just an hour to complete" my achy huevos!]
