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defeating active shooters: Isla Vista case study
I'm going to work from fairly public methods, apply them to the Isla Vista shooter, and figure out what we can do to prevent future atrocities. No holds barred -- and this particular special snowflake left us tons of physical evidence.
Conventional counter-terrorist doctrine depends on spotting what terrorists do, as opposed to who they are. One training program is titled Seven Signs of Terrorism. If you prefer, video is here.
1) Surveillance & 2) Elicitation
This terrorist ("ER" for his initials; I do not wish to add to his notoriety) targeted his residence and places close to where he lived for emotional reasons. In his final video, he states "Yes, after I have annihilated every single girl in the [Alpha Phi] sorority house, I'll take to the streets of Isla Vista and slay every single person I see there."
Unfortunately, an active shooter attack where the attacker does not expect to or wish to survive is one of the easiest types of terrorist attack to plan. Police response was swift and decisive. It is notable that he did not actually get into the sorority house -- he knocked and no one answered the door. The atrocity could have had a much more serious outcome had he successfully made entry. He then took to the streets as promised, killing another with gunfire and wounding several with both gunfire and his vehicle before being neutralized.
If he had watched residences for routine activities or questioned people looking for security issues, his attack could have been far more effective. Merely timing the attack during a party announced to the public -- during which doors are often left open -- would have dramatically increased both confusion and casualties.
3) Tests of Security
There is no evidence that ER tested physical security on his target residence(s) or in the community of Isla Vista. I will need to read his manifesto (yuk) to determine this for certain. However, college security is remarkably poor and visitors to sororities and fraternities are so common as to avoid suspicion.
4) Acquiring Supplies
ER purchased three semiautomatic handguns and 41 magazines from three different firearms dealers. The quantity of ammo purchased is not suspicious -- the number of magazines is suspicious. It will be interesting in coming days to see if any of the dealers have observations that they could have made.
This is a typical FBI alert memo, indicating the kind of firearms behaviors that are suspicious: http://oathkeepers.org/oath/wp-content/uploads/FBInotice00.pdf
However this suspect purchased only the lawful low-capacity magazines.
5) Suspicious People & 6) Dry or Trial Runs
In a walking urban community, it is nearly impossible to detect 'suspicious' people.
It is possible that ER conducted a trial run. I will need to read his manifesto. The potential active shooter at DeAnza College a decade or so ago was caught because he took photographs of his intentions and had them developed by a local film shop. A film shop employee called her father, a deputy sheriff, who instructed her to report the photos. Police raided the would-be shooter's house one day before he planned to carry out his attack. With the rise of digital cameras, this is less likely. However, ER even posted YouTube videos warning of his attentions and made it through a police visit to his residence in April 2014. This was a missed opportunity.
7) Deploying Assets or Getting Into Position
Like the Virginia Tech shooter, he started his atrocity by killing those who would have most readily alerted authorities to his intentions - his roommates. It is clear that he must have caught them by surprise to prevail in a one-on-three against stronger, taller victims.
Once the attack has commenced, there is little police can do except "roll to the sound of the guns." The window of opportunity for neutralizing the shooter prior to the loss of life has closed.
If only there were a way to identify the attacker prior to his preparation for acts of terrorism... watch for my next post.
Conventional counter-terrorist doctrine depends on spotting what terrorists do, as opposed to who they are. One training program is titled Seven Signs of Terrorism. If you prefer, video is here.
1) Surveillance & 2) Elicitation
This terrorist ("ER" for his initials; I do not wish to add to his notoriety) targeted his residence and places close to where he lived for emotional reasons. In his final video, he states "Yes, after I have annihilated every single girl in the [Alpha Phi] sorority house, I'll take to the streets of Isla Vista and slay every single person I see there."
Unfortunately, an active shooter attack where the attacker does not expect to or wish to survive is one of the easiest types of terrorist attack to plan. Police response was swift and decisive. It is notable that he did not actually get into the sorority house -- he knocked and no one answered the door. The atrocity could have had a much more serious outcome had he successfully made entry. He then took to the streets as promised, killing another with gunfire and wounding several with both gunfire and his vehicle before being neutralized.
If he had watched residences for routine activities or questioned people looking for security issues, his attack could have been far more effective. Merely timing the attack during a party announced to the public -- during which doors are often left open -- would have dramatically increased both confusion and casualties.
3) Tests of Security
There is no evidence that ER tested physical security on his target residence(s) or in the community of Isla Vista. I will need to read his manifesto (yuk) to determine this for certain. However, college security is remarkably poor and visitors to sororities and fraternities are so common as to avoid suspicion.
4) Acquiring Supplies
ER purchased three semiautomatic handguns and 41 magazines from three different firearms dealers. The quantity of ammo purchased is not suspicious -- the number of magazines is suspicious. It will be interesting in coming days to see if any of the dealers have observations that they could have made.
This is a typical FBI alert memo, indicating the kind of firearms behaviors that are suspicious: http://oathkeepers.org/oath/wp-content/uploads/FBInotice00.pdf
However this suspect purchased only the lawful low-capacity magazines.
5) Suspicious People & 6) Dry or Trial Runs
In a walking urban community, it is nearly impossible to detect 'suspicious' people.
It is possible that ER conducted a trial run. I will need to read his manifesto. The potential active shooter at DeAnza College a decade or so ago was caught because he took photographs of his intentions and had them developed by a local film shop. A film shop employee called her father, a deputy sheriff, who instructed her to report the photos. Police raided the would-be shooter's house one day before he planned to carry out his attack. With the rise of digital cameras, this is less likely. However, ER even posted YouTube videos warning of his attentions and made it through a police visit to his residence in April 2014. This was a missed opportunity.
7) Deploying Assets or Getting Into Position
Like the Virginia Tech shooter, he started his atrocity by killing those who would have most readily alerted authorities to his intentions - his roommates. It is clear that he must have caught them by surprise to prevail in a one-on-three against stronger, taller victims.
Once the attack has commenced, there is little police can do except "roll to the sound of the guns." The window of opportunity for neutralizing the shooter prior to the loss of life has closed.
If only there were a way to identify the attacker prior to his preparation for acts of terrorism... watch for my next post.